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Introduction
1 On 12 June 1975, just a few days after the ratification of the new Greek constitution,
Constantinos Karamanlis’ government submitted a formal application for Greece to join
the European Economic Community (EEC). On the same day, Karamanlis informed the
ambassadors of the nine member states of the Community that “Greece belongs and
desires to belong in Europe, with which it has been connected for a long time in many
ways – politically, economically and historically. Today’s initiative constitutes a natural
continuity of the policy I inaugurated fifteen years ago… Greece does not desire full
membership solely on economic grounds. The reasons are mainly political and refer to
the consolidation of democracy and the future of the nation”.1
2 The  accepted  narrative  in  Greek  political  history  has  tended  to  describe  Greece’s
decision to seek full EEC membership as a gradual process that had its origins in the
late  1950s  and  especially,  in  the  1961  Athens  Association  Agreement.2 During  this
period the European option evolved to become for the Greeks, almost a panacea that
would  cure  all  the  country’s  problems,  from  economic  modernization  to  external
security.3 Indeed, Kostas Yfantis, focusing mainly on the security dimension, pointed
out “that membership was perceived as a means to balance United States’ influence and
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power,  while  cementing  Greece’s  Western  orientation  and  commitment”.4 Jose  M.
Magone agrees with this argument, stating that “Karamanlis presented the EEC as an
alternative to the rejected patronage of the United States”.5 Similarly, Giannis Valinakis
claims that “it was only natural to consider the European option as the only way to
strengthen  Greece’s  bargaining  power  and  defence  capabilities  vis-à-vis  Turkey”.6
Other  commentators,  such  as  Panos  Kazakos,  Loukas  Tsoukalis  and  George
Yannopoulos, focus on the highly beneficial economic effects of a possible entry into
the EEC.7 
3 Yet amid the voluminous writings on the security and economic dimensions of Greece’s
application  to  join  the  European  Community,  there  has  been  relatively  limited
historical and archival-based analysis of an important political dimension to the issue,
namely,  the link between European integration and the democratization process  in
Greece. This link has been studied within a specific,  albeit exponentially important,
field of “transition” literature that seeks to assess the importance of the international
dimension  in  shaping  and  constraining  national  democratization  processes.8 For
instance, Geoffrey Pridham and Nikoforos Diamantouros have documented the close
relationship between European integration and democratic consolidation in Southern
Europe.9 Laurence Whitehead notes that the “prospect of membership in the European
community produced a substantial long-term pressure for democratization”.10
4 While accepting the importance of economic and security considerations, this paper
will  shed  light  on  what  ultimately  drove  Greece’s  European  policy,  namely,  the
overriding importance of the democratization factor in Karamanlis’ quest for Europe.
In  Athens,  a  strong  link  was  to  develop  between  the  European  option  and  the
democratization process, to the point that the two became very closely interrelated,
especially in the minds of the country’s ruling elite. 
 
The first crucial months of transition
5 On 24 July 1974, Constantinos Karamanlis was recalled from his self-imposed exile in
Paris to restore democracy in his homeland. This was in the aftermath of the collapse of
the Greek military junta prompted by Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus on 20 July 1974.11
Karamanlis returned as a deus ex machina to carry out a transformation of the Greek
political  system  and  to  consolidate  democracy.  He  was  considered  to  be  the  most
suitable person to facilitate the transition from dictatorship to democracy. His anti-
communist  record  and  his  conservative  credentials  in  the  1950s  and  early  1960s,
coupled  with  his  critical  attitude  towards  the  junta,  made  him  acceptable  to  the
military, the anti-monarchist right and the political center respectively.12
6 As has been suggested by many political scientists, Greek transition to democracy was
to become primarily, a “from above project”, since the seven years of dictatorship and
the events that led to its fall “were not particularly conducive to a comprehensive and
collective  strategy  for  democratization”.13 Upon  his  return,  Karamanlis  faced  a
situation of “structural and institutional tabula rasa”.14 The monarchy and the army,
once important actors in the formulation of Greek foreign and domestic policy, had
been completely discredited in the aftermath of the fall of the colonels. The weight of
the transition process was thus, inevitably, to fall on the shoulders of Karamanlis and
his very close associates. 
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7 The task confronting the new Greek prime minister was daunting. The fall of the junta
and the advent of democracy were linked to national humiliation over Cyprus and the
possibility of a war with Turkey. Moreover, the imposition of the military dictatorship
was  viewed  by  many  in  Greece  as  having  resulted  from  the  discredited  pre-coup
political  system  with  its  permeability  to  foreign  influence.  This  conviction  led  a
significant section of political forces and public opinion in Greece to demand a truly
new beginning and a break with the post-war period.15 In turn,  a  genuine pluralist
democracy  presupposed  and  demanded  the  reduction  and  control of  foreign
interference in Greek domestic affairs.16 
8 The strong foreign influence, which went all the way back to the establishment of the
Greek state in 1830, meant that Greek public opinion took for granted the existence of
an explicit connection between a political regime and its external links.17 Greece had a
tradition of participation in numerous alliances throughout its modern history. Such
alliances  had  enabled  Greece  to  strengthen  its  national  security  and  advance  its
economic development. Often, however, they had resulted in handicapped democratic
institutions and had subjected Greece’s national domestic politics to foreign influence,
if not outright interference.18
9 With the settlement following the Second World War, Greece experienced a separate
and traumatic civil war. The defeat of the Communists was achieved, ultimately, only
with direct help from the British, and then from the Americans in the latter phases of
the civil war. From the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United States
was to spend nearly $4 billion in economic and military assistance to various Greek
governments. This had succeeded in minimizing Soviet influence in the region and also,
provided  NATO  and  the  United  States  a  paramount  strategic  position  in  the
Mediterranean.19 However,  the  receptiveness  to  foreign  interference  by  the  Greek
ruling elites also contributed to making the United States’ involvement in the country’s
domestic affairs so intense.20 This conveyed the impression of a country willingly open
to penetration and external manipulation, confirming the traditional “permeability of
Greek domestic politics to foreign influence”.21
10 The  dependence  of  Greece  on  the  United  States  or,  at  least,  the  Greek  public’s
perception of this, is important in explaining the wave of vehement anti-Americanism
that  dominated the Greek domestic  scene during and,  especially  after,  the  military
dictatorship  and  the  Cyprus  debacle  that  followed.22 Although  recent  research  has
debunked the myth that the United States gave a green light to the coup that brought
the brutish and brutal junta to power, the majority of Greeks believed the contrary.23
This  was  to  be  highlighted  by  Greek  foreign  minister  George  Mavros  who,  in  a
discussion with Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor, was to sigh dramatically, that
“every Greek [is] convinced that the Greek dictatorship was supported by the United
States”.24 
11 The transition to democracy in Greece was taking place, therefore, in a climate of acute
ambivalence. The new leadership in Athens was under great domestic pressure to act
when  confronted  with  the  grave  consequences  of  the  double  Turkish  invasion  of
Cyprus.25 The new Prime Minister concluded however, that the option of war against
Turkey would be a parlous course to follow since seven years of the junta had left both
the  country’s  frontiers  unprotected  and  the  army  in  a  ruinous  state  of  disorder.
Moreover,  Karamanlis  had  to  satisfy  people’s  growing  thirst  for  the  country’s
independence from foreign interference and to achieve this, meant “reducing Greece’s
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reliance upon the United States and NATO, at least on the surface”.26 The dilemma for
Karamanlis was however, that as long as Turkey remained the principal threat, any
moves  to  isolate  Greece  from  the  United  States  and  NATO  would  only  benefit  the
enemy. The new government had to perform a careful balancing act.
12 Instead of taking the path to war with Turkey, Karamanlis chose to withdraw from the
military  command  of  NATO  on  14 August  1974  and  he  requested  also,  that  formal
negotiations begin on the future of United States’ bases and facilities on Greek soil.27 In
the years that followed, he accounted for his decision by saying that “the withdrawal
from NATO was not only justified but necessary. The fury of the Greek and Cypriot
people was so great at that time that the only alternative would have been war”.28 This
decision, made at the height of the Cyprus crisis, reflected the frustration of the Greeks
at  the failure of  the United States  and its  NATO allies  to  forestall  Turkish military
actions.29 It had become by then a universal conviction among the Greek public that
reducing  and  controlling  foreign  interference  would  be  one  of  the  primary
preconditions for building a strong pluralist democracy. Or, as Karamanlis put it in a
private letter to a close friend, “the establishment of a democratic regime required a
change in Greece’s relationship with the United States”.30
13 The  fact  that  during  this  period  Karamanlis  turned  towards  Europe  has  been
interpreted as a search for a United States substitute.31 However, records clearly show
that even though he pursued a European path and withdrew from NATO, he did not
denounce the country’s relationship with the United States. Instead, Karamanlis opted
for  a  multilateral  foreign  policy,  signalling  a  disengagement  from  the  monolithic
approaches of the past.32 His multilateralism however, did not mean ending the close
relationship  between  Greece  and  the  United  States.33 Greece  was  still  a  Cold  War
frontline state in need of United States’ security and protection and Karamanlis was
nothing if not pragmatic, keenly aware both of political realities and the limitations of
the EEC’s security capabilities.34
14 While there were potential security dimensions over integration into Western Europe
for  Greeks  to  consider,  an  analysis  of  archival  sources  shows  that  other  political
considerations were to predominate. As the leader of a small country with relatively
feeble  domestic  institutions,  Karamanlis  was  sure  in  his  belief  that,  alongside  the
creation of a legitimate governmental climate and economic modernization, the Greeks
needed to join the EEC to build a  solid democracy.35 Thus,  the main reason behind
Greece’s  choice  for  gaining  European  membership  was  to  use  this  as  a  political
instrument  to  strengthen  democratization  and  reduce  the  risks  of  any  return  to
military  regimes.  From  the  very  beginning  therefore,  the  Greek  foreign  policy
commitment  to  gaining  membership  of  the  EEC  was  enmeshed  in  the  politics  of
democratic transition in Greece.36
15 On 22 August 1974, just a few days after the Karamanlis government took office, Greece
formally requested the reactivation the Athens Association agreement of 1961 that had
been  frozen  in  April  1967  following  the  Colonels’  coup.  The  suspension  of  the
Association  Agreement  to  the  status  of  “current  administration”  after  the  coup,
coupled with the forced withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe in 1969, had
contributed  to  the  erosion  of  domestic  approval  for  the  junta  and  frustrated  the
attempts of the dictators to gain support from important European political elites.37
The  financial  consequences  of  the  suspension  of  the  Association  Agreement  had
harmed the Greek economy.  Even the dictators  were seriously troubled by the EEC
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decision and tried to lift the freeze by threatening the European Commission with legal
action  while,  at  the  same  time,  trying  to  dispel  perceptions  that  they  were
diplomatically isolated. In refusing to reconsider the suspension of the Association, the
European Community was demonstrating that a lack of democracy was, and would be,
the principal hurdle to any further integration.38
16 Therefore,  in  marked contrast  to  the perceived indifference,  even tolerance,  of  the
Americans towards the Colonels’ rule, the EEC had used its diplomatic and economic
weight  to  undermine  the  legitimacy  of  the  military  dictatorship.  It  was  clear  to
Karamanlis that the EEC link could have positive effects on the Greek political system
even though the Community’s role in the collapse of military rule in Greece had been,
ultimately, secondary in comparison to external events.39 Unlike NATO, the EEC had
played,  throughout,  a  crucial  role in denying the regime legitimacy by insisting on
democratic  preconditions  and  by  isolating  Greece  from  the  Western  family  of
democracies.40
17 Therefore, to the Greeks, the Community became associated with liberal democratic
values. As Emanuel Gazzo, the mastermind and editor of Agence Europe, aptly points out,
the EEC’s decision to freeze the Association gave rise to “an interesting phenomenon
where  the  process  of  European  integration  was  identified  with  the  defence  of
democratic values”.41 It was this identification that contributed to the emergence of the
Community  as  an  institution  enjoying  significant  goodwill  among  Greece’s  new
democratic leadership, especially during the first years of transition from dictatorship
to democracy in 1974 and 1975. From the very first day, Karamanlis emphasized the
support  of  the  Community  to  achieving  democratization.  It  was  hardly  surprising
therefore,  that  Greece’s  memorandum  to  the  European  Economic  Community  on
22 August 1974 focused on the influence of the EEC on the collapse of the junta and
identified the Community with the upholding of liberal democratic values.42
18 In this respect, the Athens government was confident that the immediate restoration of
the  Association  Agreement  would  constitute  a  vote  of  confidence  from  the  Nine.
Clearly,  from the very beginning,  Karamanlis’  aim was to bring into play the EEC’s
prestige  as  a  defender  of  democracy  and  democratic  values.  Moreover,  the
“unfreezing” of the Association with the EEC would also bring economic benefits that
would be vital to Greek efforts to democratize. The emphasis for Athens now, was on
the  need  to  revive  the  Association  and  most  importantly,  to  move  forward  and
harmonize Greek agricultural policy with the Common Agricultural Policy obtaining
the  remaining  $55.7 million  from the  first  financial  protocol  of  the  agreement  and
including  the  three  new  EEC  members,  Britain,  Denmark  and  Ireland  into  the
Association  agreement.43 Indeed,  one  of  the  most  pressing  issues  for  the  emerging
Greek democracy was the revitalization of its economy. In autumn of 1974, growth had
stalled and there was a resurgence of the 30% inflation that had plagued the economy
from the last quarter of 1972 into the first quarter of 1974. The perennial trade deficit
had to be reduced as it had risen to a staggering $400 million, exacerbated by soaring
oil prices and plummeting earnings from tourism and emigrant remittances.44
19 Karamanlis’ insistence on the integration of Greece into the European family as being
the  most  appropriate  solution  for  its  political  as  well  as  economic  problems  was
boosted by the expression of solidarity with Greece’s nascent democracy by Western
Europe.  On 19 August  1974,  the president of  the European Parliament (EP),  Cornelis
Berkhouwer,  visited Athens to  mark publicly  the institution’s  support  for  all  Greek
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endeavours towards achieving democracy.45 This proved to be extremely important to
the Greeks. In their search for political acceptance and legitimacy, since 1967, the EP
had been the most vociferous of the Community’s bodies in its criticism of the Colonels.
46
20 A close associate of Karamanlis, Petros Molyviatis, has confirmed in an interview that
the strategic choice of the EEC dominated the prime minister’s mind: “all the decisions
taken in the first crucial months of the transition constituted an integral part of the
government’s central European policy and ambitions”.47 Likewise, in early August 1974,
Greek minister of economics, Ioannis Pesmazoglou, in a meeting at the British Embassy
in Athens, explained that, “it was vital to the government that their relations with the
EEC should not only be normalized but be seen to be normalized, and that this in itself
would  make  a  great  contribution  to  the  new  team’s  stability  and  to  the  cause  of
democracy itself in Greece”.48
21 An  indication  of  the  emerging  link  between  Greece’s  European  integration  and  its
democratization was the parallel course that the government was following in domestic
affairs and in its policies concerning the EEC. At all stages during the transition period
the Greek government made sure that the one process complemented the other. On
23 September 1974 it abolished law 509, under which the Communist party had been
banned. This new institutional arrangement paved the way for the legalization of the
Greek  Communist  Party  (KKE),  outlawed  since  1947  as  a  result  of  the  civil  war.
Karamanlis’  decision was the validation of his goal,  declared earlier in July 1974, to
pursue a policy of national reconciliation which would put an end to the divisions of
the civil war that had been perpetuated by the exclusivist post-war political system.49
In  an  interview  with  Roger  Massip,  a  well-known  French  journalist,  Karamanlis
confessed that “the legalisation of KKE was a necessary measure in order to equate
ourselves [Greeks] with the democratic countries of the West. If I hadn’t done it, we
would not have been able to convince our European partners of the sincerity of our
efforts to restore democracy in Greece”.50 The European option, therefore, thoroughly
permeated Karamanlis’ transition strategy although it was not declared publicly at the
outset. While he was always keen to seek EEC full membership, he remained cautious
enough to await successful internal reforms. This caution accounts for his initial focus
on the state of the Greek Association with the Community.
22 His hesitant stance was necessary since Karamanlis had not yet legitimized his power
or position, exercising these so far, through the grace and favour of a section of the
army. Accordingly, the summer of 1974 witnessed an impressive series of actions in
Greece,  each of which would contribute to the restoration of a democratic political
system.  Along  with  the  constitutional  act  of  1 August  1974,  Greece  abolished  the
constitution  promulgated  by  the  military  dictatorship  and  reactivated  the  1952
constitution while excluding the clauses related to the head of the state –namely the
issue of the monarchy.51 The resuscitated 1952 constitution allowed the prime minister
to re-assert civilian control over the military, but above all,  Karamanlis was able to
restore individual and political liberties. The latter was essential if the new government
was to convey the message of a genuine democratic transformation that would permit
Greece  eventually  to  resume its  place  in  democratic  Europe,  and in  particular,  the
Council of Europe.52
23 Notwithstanding  the  absence  of  elections,  the  Europeans  were  quick  to  reward
Karamanlis’  initial  steps  towards  democracy  and  encourage  the  democratization
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process even more through the swift readmission of Greece to the Council of Europe on
27 September  and  the  EEC’s  decision  to  reactivate  the  Association  Agreement  on
17 September  1974.  In  order  to  comprehend  how  important  and  significant  these
decisions were, it must be noted that at this point, post-junta Greece had yet to conduct
elections. The Council of Europe could have taken a strictly legalistic view on Greek
readmission on the basis of Article 25 which could exclude any country until it held
democratic elections. As the perceived cradle of European civilization however, Greece
had special claims to sympathy and the Europeans expected these moves to encourage
and strengthen the  country’s  processes  in  democratization.53 All  the  above  specific
measures, along with the unfreezing of the Association, publicly underlined Western
Europe’s welcome of democracy’s return to Greece.54
24 As the Greeks would experience during the negotiations to enter into the EEC, there
was a real distinction between the rhetoric and the reality of the Community. Although
the  EEC  was  quick  to  reactivate  the  Athens  agreement,  there  was  a  difference  of
opinion  on  what  normalisation  would  actually  entail.  Officially,  reactivation  of  the
association meant the release of the outstanding $56 million under the frozen financial
protocol, the ratification of an additional protocol with the newer EEC members, the
harmonisation of agriculture and putting into force once again, all the arrangements
that had applied before April 1967.
25 There  was  a  huge  divergence  in  the  Community’s  and  Greek  perceptions  of  what
harmonisation of agriculture actually entailed. In a meeting with Commission president
François-Xavier Ortoli,  Pesmazoglou underlined the importance of agriculture to his
country.55 However,  agricultural  commissioner,  Pierre  Lardinois,  insisted  that  the
Community  would  not  be  able  to  respond  to  the  Greek  demands  over  agriculture,
pointing out that: “for example, there is a whole series of regulations in the Community
that  did not  exist  in 1967”.56 Negotiations on agricultural  harmonisation had taken
place  from  1962  to  1967  with  little  success  and  had  been  broken  off  when  the
Association was frozen. The signs were that if anything, agriculture would be an even
greater problem for the newly enlarged Community.57
26 The apparent procrastination in getting on with agricultural harmonisation planted
the first seeds of doubt in Karamanlis’ mind over his transition strategy. It appeared
that if  he wanted to reap entirely the rewards of European support in political and
economic terms, he would have to accelerate the process of integrating Greece fully
into the European Community. Even though an eventual Greek membership of the EEC
was at the forefront of his strategy, Karamanlis had been hesitant so far in pursuing it
directly because of domestic political and economic difficulties. Instead, he had opted,
as a first stage, for the full implementation of the Association Agreement seeking to
link the European integration process with the country’s democratisation. The news
from  Brussels,  however,  had  not  been  encouraging.  The  Nine  understood  the
importance of the European link and had offered the support the Greek government
had requested;  yet,  at  the  same time,  they  did  not  seem willing  to  go  beyond the
minimum  required.  They  would  only  reactivate  those  parts  of  the  Association
Agreement that were easy to implement whereas harmonisation of agriculture, which
was so vital to Greece, could easily be allowed to drag on for a long time, as in the past.
27 Karamanlis thus, became convinced that a full restoration of effective relations with
the EEC was contingent on the existence not just of a Greek civilian government, but
also, of a democratically elected one. With his mind made up, Karamanlis announced to
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the Greek people that elections would be held on the historic day of 17 November, the
anniversary of the 1973 student uprising against the junta. However, his decision to
hold elections so quickly was criticised heavily by opposition parties on a number of
grounds. Their main argument rested on the contention that holding elections so soon
after the restoration of democracy did not allow enough time for all  the parties to
organise a proper electoral campaign.58 Karamanlis worried that, with time passing, the
problems endemic to Greek democracy would revive army solidarity against civilian
“mismanagement”.59 Moreover,  the  longer  the  elections  were  delayed,  the  more
ammunition the EEC would accumulate to resist the further integration of Greece.
 
From Elections to EEC application
28 The  17 November  1974  election  was  a  personal  triumph  for  Karamanlis.  New
Democracy won a massive victory: 54 per cent of the popular vote and 219 seats out of
the  300-seat  parliament.60 The  implicit  slogan of  the  campaign,  “Karamanlis  or  the
tanks”,  illustrated  well  the  unprecedented  desire  of  the  Greek  people  to  ensure
democracy  at  any  cost.  To  entrench  stability  still  further  within  the  country,  a
referendum  on  the  future  of  the  monarchy  followed  soon  after  the  parliamentary
elections. Displaying the same respect for democratic procedures, on 8 December 1974
nearly  70 per  cent  of  Greeks  voted  for  a  republic  and  against  re-instituting  the
monarchy. By the end of 1974, the two major partners of the old establishment –the
army and the monarchy– had been deprived of political power. Henceforth, power was
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  political  parties  and  parliament,  a  development  that
reinforced Greece’s image as an emerging and genuine democracy. 
29 In  an  interview  with  the  foreign  press,  Karamanlis  was  asked  to  outline  the  main
achievements of the National Unity Government and state the main goals of the newly
elected  government.  His  answer  was  “the  restoration  of  democracy  and  the
consolidation of democracy” respectively.61 The EEC had played a major role in Greece’s
recent achievements. The approval it had provided had added to the new government’s
legitimacy. Most importantly perhaps, Karamanlis’ government had capitalised on the
prospect  of  joining  the  EEC  as  part  of  its  transition strategy  to  safeguard  Greek
democracy.  However,  the  next  stage  was  to  be  more  difficult.  Karamanlis  had
recognized early on that  European support  would not necessarily  be guaranteed to
Greece over the long term, and that, even more worryingly, the current status of the
Association  Agreement  did  not  meet  the  pressing  demands  of the  Greeks  for  the
agricultural harmonization and further economic assistance that were so important to
the stabilization process.  It  is  not surprising that in the aftermath of the elections,
Karamanlis highlighted persistently, the Europe–liberal democracy link, both in public
and in contacts with leaders from the EEC.
30 However,  not  all  Greek  political  actors welcomed  Karamanlis’  strategy  of  linking
Greece’s integration in European institutions with the process of democratization. In
fact, even before the formal EEC application had been lodged, a series of parliamentary
debates took place that indicated clearly, that EEC membership was a matter of dispute
in the Greek political  arena.  With the exception of  the Centre Union,  which under
Mavros’ leadership embraced the European beliefs of the ruling party, PASOK and the
KKE opposed the choice of the EEC on the grounds that it was detrimental to national
independence and served the interests of international capitalism.62
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31 In spite of such opposition, Karamanlis held firmly onto the European option. The first
months  of  the  reactivated  Association  agreement  had  convinced  him  that  such  a
framework was inadequate for  Greece’s  political  and economic ambitions.  As  Ortoli
admitted later, “the Greek government quickly realized that the interest aroused in
Europe by the change of regime could quickly erode and the government risked losing
the support of the Community, if it remained within the framework of association. The
difficulties  encountered  in  1974-5  concerning  the  harmonization  of  agricultural
policies and the current delays in the negotiations of  the second financial  protocol
show  that  these  apprehensions  are  not  without  foundation”.63 Therefore,  it  was
becoming imperative for Greece to be integrated into the EEC as an equal member. On
24-25 February  1975,  during  an  official  visit  of  French  foreign  minister,  Jean
Sauvagnargues, to Athens, Karamanlis reiterated his European vision once more, but
this time explicitly asking for full membership.64
32 While  discussing  the  EEC  with  Gaston  Thorn,  prime  minister  of  Luxembourg,
Karamanlis was confident that the aspiration and expectation of achieving membership
eventually,  with all  its  attendant economic and political  benefits,  would hasten the
development of democratic restoration and would also convey to the Greek electorate
the  importance  of  Greece  being  integrated  into  Europe  for  democratic  stability.65
Karamanlis  believed  deeply  in  the  reciprocal  relationship  between  democratic
consolidation and accession to the EEC. The consistency of his tactics was underlined
later, during Karamanlis’ official visits to France and Germany between April and May
1975.66
33 The following month, Karamanlis succeeded in having the new constitution approved
and put into force on 11 June 1975. Although the first governmental draft had been
heavily  criticised  by  the  opposition  parties,  the  main  provisions  remained  intact,
leading  the  opposition  to  boycott  the  approval  of  the  constitution  on  7 June  1975.
However, the new constitution signaled the normalization of public life and the last
step towards the full restoration of democracy. Moreover, it was to secure the legally
unhindered accession of Greece to the EEC.67 Just one day after the activation of the
new constitution, Karamanlis applied for full membership of the EEC. The mainstream
newspaper Kathimerini ran an article on its front page focusing on the reasons that had
led the Prime Minister to seek membership.  Apart  from the economic and security
factors, the democratic dimension featured as the most prominent reason.68
34 According  to  the  newspaper,  the  EEC  application  was  the  last  stage  of  Greece’s
transition to democracy, but it was at the same time, paradoxically, the starting point
for its consolidation. In other words, the prospect of accession had been influential
during the one-year period of democratic transition, while the formal application and
final accession would become the ultimate guarantee for Greek democratic institutions
in the years to come.69 The latter theme was reiterated in 1980, on the eve of Greece’s
entry  to  the  EEC  by  the  then  foreign  minister,  Constantinos  Mitsotakis,  when  he
argued, 
naturally, we do not expect our nine partners in the Community to become the
guardians of Greek democracy. By joining a broader group of like-minded Western
Democracies, however, our own democratic institutions will be reinforced. […] They
[potential  dictators]  are  bound to  know that  the abolition of  democracy entails
immediate  ostracism  from  the  Community.  This  could  have  grave  internal  and
external consequences. So, in this respect, the EEC is a safe haven.70
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Conclusion
35 Karamanlis  had  unveiled  his  European  option  as  far  back  as  1958  when  he  had
requested an Association Agreement for Greece. He pursued the same route, with even
more rigour in the name of democratization, from the moment he returned to power in
1974. Under his premiership, Greece invoked the European path from the beginning of
its  transition towards democracy and ensured both processes  ran in a  parallel  and
mutually reinforcing mode. This synergy can be better understood when examined in
the light of modern Greek history that shows traditionally, a strong link between the
country’s external orientation and its domestic political and economic systems. This
historical aspect is important if one is to understand why Karamanlis found it so vital,
in the aftermath of the fall of the junta and the tragic events in Cyprus, to make a break
–in the name of genuine democracy– with the practices of the discredited past. Pre-
junta Greece had been subject, in the eyes of Greek public opinion, to direct American
interference. Thus, a re-orientation of foreign policy, even if only a cosmetic one, was
needed. The launch of a multilateral foreign policy where the European option would
feature prominently became the favoured answer to the democratisation puzzle.
36 Karamanlis certainly did not look to the EEC as a substitute for United States influence
and security even though it cannot be denied that he and his government were deeply
bitter about, in particular, the indifferent stance adopted by the Americans during the
second invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. The ruling elite hardly even considered the EEC
to be an alternative to the United States and NATO. However, the domestic constraints
determined by the growing anti-American sentiments that peaked in 1974 left little
room for maneuver and do much to account for the country’s withdrawal from the
military command of NATO. Yet throughout, Karamanlis remained deeply aware of the
political  and  security  realities  determined  by  the  wider  East-West  international
context. Moreover, the only feasible security gains he expected to reap from entry to
the EEC were those emanating from the country’s greater international leverage.71
37 The  strategy  of  linking  democratization  with  Greece’s  European  integration  was
facilitated by the fact that, in the aftermath of the junta, the EEC had emerged as an
institution that enjoyed significant goodwill amongst the Greek public. The freezing of
the Athens Association Agreement and the general critical attitude adopted towards
the  military  dictatorship  by  the  EEC  had  led  it  to  being  identified  with  liberal
democratic values. Even those experts in the Greek government who saw things mainly
through the  prism of  economics,  now conceded  that  the  European  option  was  the
essential element in nurturing a stable Greek democracy.72
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  sheds  light  on  what  drove  Greece’s  European  policy  in  the  aftermath  of  the
dictatorship in 1974. Despite evident geostrategic and economic motivations, the article stresses
the centrality of the political and democratic dimension. Greece’s transition to democracy saw
the emergence of a strong link between the European option and the democratization process,
especially in the mind of the country’s political elite. Constantinos Karamanlis, the Greek prime
minister, capitalized greatly on the prospect of EEC membership as part of his transition strategy
to safeguard democracy.
Cet  article  montre  les  ressorts  de  la  politique  européenne  de  la  Grèce  au  lendemain  de  la
dictature en 1974. Au-delà des évidentes motivations géostratégiques et économiques, l’article
souligne la centralité de la dimension politique et démocratique. La transition démocratique de la
Grèce  a  vu  l’émergence  d’un  lien  fort  entre  l’option  européenne  et  le  processus  de
démocratisation, particulièrement auprès de l’élite politique du pays. Le premier ministre grec
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Constantinos Karamanlis a largement bénéficié de la perspective de l’entrée de la Grèce dans la
Communauté  économique  européenne  dans  sa  stratégie  de  transition  pour  sauvegarder  la
démocratie.
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